Manuela Gomez has just published a book about Argentinian philosopher Jose Ingenieros (whose works have never been translated to English) where she links his ideas to those of Ralph Waldo Emerson. In a wider perspective, some gaps between Latin American philosophy and pragmatism are bridged.

Rediscovering the Philosophical Importance of Jose Ingenieros: A Bridge Between Two Worlds is being published by VDM Verlag in 12 countries. Manuela was born in Cd. Juarez and she obtained her M.A. in Philosophy from Texas A&M. Yesterday, August 8th, she held a book presentation at the Centro Cultural Paso del Norte in Cd. Juarez, Chihuahua where professors, students, and spectators alike gathered to witness Manuela's first book. The panel of about 5 professors, including Manuela herself, gave their take on the book itself. Some placed the book in its historical context, while others praised Manuela's achievement. There was an overall sentiment of joy and inspiration; one audience member commenting during the Q&A segment that he believed that girls should look up to Manuela in being well educated. He went on to say that this is the kind of people Cd. Juarez needs, but that he was sure that there were many Manuelas in this city; we just need to polish them.

here is a part of the draft of my thesis proposal, tell me what you find here, it has already been turned in, but comments are aprecciated for future work!
In the effort of filtering possibility from conceivability claims, many problems arise. In order to come to possibility from conceivability a method can be followed. Nevertheless the method is problematic given the overlapping of steps. I will briefly explain how the method works, the reason for following that order of steps and where it is that the overlapping takes place. It is in the overlapping where I will spend more time comparing the problem of confusing epistemology with metaphysics when it comes to different perspectives of two-dimensionalism. The last topic has to do with arguments that show a problematic view of two-dimensionalism and the confusion of epistemology and metaphysics and mistreatment of descriptions. I have not added a sufficient explanation yet since more information is required at this point, but those issues will be addressed in a future draft.
What I want to do with this research is try to find more complete ways to address the problem of the overlapping steps and their similitude with two-dimensionalism. It is my purpose to try to avoid falling under the reliance on a confusing view of metaphysics. Here is an overview of the main topics that I want to address (this far)

1. Filtering possibility: How is it that a conceivable state of affairs could make reference to impossible states of affairs?
2. Method: intuition… epistemology… metaphysics…
3. Overlapping of steps 1^2 and 2^ 3
4. Incomplete nature of the world
5. Given (3) ^ (4) possible confusion of metaphysics and epistemology
6. Avoiding non-essential generalizations
7. Two-dimensionalism semantics
8. Possible additions that I would like to address but have not read enough yet

Filtering possibility
Conceivability can be found in some of the arguments concerning fundamental philosophical questions. This fact happens to be problematic since a conceivable claim that could be used for further theoretical relevance might be resting in weak foundations attributing false possibility. A conceivable claim is not necessarily an argument for the possibility of some states of affairs. This will be supported by a three step method that consists of an intuition claim, an epistemic claim and a metaphysical filter. After these three steps the conceivability argument becomes a metaphysical possibility if it doesn’t show any problematic pattern in its way to the third step.

A possible method

Thus the method consists of the following:

1. Intuitive claim... what is it that we think we know from x(identify soundness of concepts)

2. Epistemic-modal claim… what is it that could be true of x given what we know and what we have proved to be truth of x (identify validity of concepts). In this step the target is the conceptual realm.

3. Metaphysical filter… what is it that is true of x given the nature of the world (identify the relation of the full argument with the way that the world is)

Notice that [(1) ^ (2)] and [(2) ^ (3)] are closely related, and that they might be confused, respectively, as one single step.

my apy polly logies!!!

ok sorry i had forgot about this blog thing. this semester was super packed, but summer is here... finally!!!!!!!! its funny because i feel like writing, it must be the weather, which is one of those things that you just and say only in El Paso, or maybe it is due to global warming, or global cooling, but the weather here is weird. anyways i'll try to post more, i have a lot to say and a lot to be corrected so please leave comments, feedback is good

Gödel's Proof

So I read this 1958 book which, according to a philosophy professor, is a must in any philosopher's library. It is concise and what's more it explains technical language, as it pertains to getting the gist of Gödel's paper, for a non-expert. The first few chapters explain the context in which Gödel, only 25 at the time, published his "On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems." In that paper Gödel proved that the axiomatic method had inherent limitations and, as the authors of Gödel's Proof Nagel and Newman indicate in the introduction to this book, Gödel proved that "it is impossible to establish the internal logical consistency of a very large class of deductive systems unless one adopts principles of reasoning so complex that their internal consistency is as open to doubt as that of the systems themselves." Indeed, this "internal logical consistency" refers to the fact that a proposition, G, and its formal negation, ~G, are formally demonstrable. If a formula and its formal negation are demonstrable it means that the axioms of that system are not consistent. Conversely, if the axioms of a system are consistent then neither the formula G nor its formal negation, ~G, are demonstrable. In short, Gödel undermined the axiomatic method. It proved that there are logical truths that cannot be demonstrated using an axiomatic method. Even if the axioms were extended so as to include the formal demonstration of a particular logical truth, there would still be other logical truths that the axioms did not cover.

What struck me as peculiarly interesting are the concluding comments by the authors in the last chapter. They give consideration to the question of whether there could ever be "calculating machines" powerful enough to match the human brain in mathematical intelligence. They acknowledge that there are some mathematical problems that are solvable by a computing machinery which are not solvable by a human beings. However, they go on, the human brain appears to embody a "structure of rules of operation" that far exceeds the structure of artificial machines. There doesn't appear to be a prospect for the replacement of human minds by robots. While these AI speculations, it must be said, only occupy a page or two in the entire 115-page book, they only serve to lead to the admonition that Gödel's paper is no excuse to start despairing. Instead, Gödel's finding "is an occasion...for a renewed appreciation of the powers of creative reason."