levels of determinism part I

for some reason I've become quite interested in determinism! and not in the religious sense, but more in the there-is-no-free-will-thanks-to-the-degree-of-freedom kind of way. well, actually, i don't mean to say that, that there is no free will, that would be to hardcore, and I'm not there yet to prove it; however, what I've been reading is a very interesting explanation of the levels of determinism that we could face. some arguments against determinism are something like the following formalism by Tymothy O'Connor in his article On the Transfer of Necessity :
(TNP) Nst p, Nst (p → q) ├ Nst q
pretty much what the statements says is that if it is necessary the case that p then q then it has to be q. the problem is when we come to the argument of what if -q? then the original statement p then q looses a little bit of credibility, because there is a case (the second case in the truth table) where an if-then relationship is false; so if it was the case that -q, even though p, then it would be necessarily the case that p then q. So, if in logic terms there is room for possibility as opposed as necessity, then a deterministic model wouldn't make full logical sense.

conceivability and possibility

it has come to my attention repeatedly the fact that many of the philosophical arguments within the philosophy of mind are based on conceivability. also many of the objections to some of the arguments are based on conceivability. Even though many would agree that as long as it is conceivable, it might be possible... right? how could it be denied that there is some sort of existence of possibilities that we just dont have access to. furthermore, the problem with possibility as opposed as conceivability is that we would have to commit to a kripkean modality , like it is not very likely to happen under a certain set of conditions but there might be a possible state of affairs under which it is possible. For example there is the zombie argument against functionalism. the problem with zombies is that they might act the same way that an active agent would, but, presumably, they wouldn't have any qualitative experience. the zombie would know what it is like to eat tofurkey, but would, nevertheless, would be able to eat it, and possibly make comments about. but the zombie would be either lying or non-consciously just trying to mimic a behavior.
this whole argument is well explored by a lot of philosophers, but it is still a conceivability argument, we cant probe it, however we can imagine a POSSIBLE world where there are zombies who are qualia absent. so it is hard to tell whether conceivability entails possibility, or possibility has different limits than conceivability.

Philosophy of Religioin

Before submitting this entry, I had begun by writing a couple of paragraphs on the problem of evil and the so-called Euthyphro's dilemma (based on a dialogue by Plato), but then regarded them as both archaic and somewhat obsolete compared to evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkin's arguments.

There exists in my opinion the most compelling and eloquent arguments yet: those of Richard Dawkins. He brings to surface qualities which a God, if one exists, might value. These include an analysis and eventual rejection of Pascal's wager, which states that one won't lose anything by either believing or not believing. If one believes, says Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), in God and it turns out that there is a God then one can only gain something, namely entrance into heaven. If there isn't a God then there is nothing to lose. If, however, one doesn't believe and it turns out that there is a God then one can only suffer eternal damnation. If there is no God and one doesn't believe then, again, there is no problem. This is of no use, says Dawkins, because "why, in any case, do we so readily accept the idea that the one thing you must do if you want to please God is believe in him?" (The God Delusion, 2006, p. 104). Dawkins goes on to talk about Bertrand Russell and how he would reply upon encountering a God after death. Russell said that he would point out the absence of evidence in God's favor. Commenting on Russell's case, Dawkins says, "Mightn't God respect Russell for his courageous scepticism (let alone for the courageous pacifism that landed him in prison in the First World War) far more than he would respect Pascal for his cowardly bet-heding?" (p. 104).

Dawkin's arguments, among many other elaborate and well-thought-out ones in his book, also include the notion of a burden of proof. Who does it rest with? Unequivocally, with the believer. We don't feel an obligation, argues Dawkins, to disprove any of the millions of "far-fetched" deities, such as Zeus, a Flying Spaghetti Monster, Apollo, a celestial teapot, Amon, Ra, Mithras, Baal, Thor, Wotan, the Golden Calf. "I just go one god further" (p. 53).

-Pablo