Friday, November 23, 2007

levels of determinism part I

for some reason I've become quite interested in determinism! and not in the religious sense, but more in the there-is-no-free-will-thanks-to-the-degree-of-freedom kind of way. well, actually, i don't mean to say that, that there is no free will, that would be to hardcore, and I'm not there yet to prove it; however, what I've been reading is a very interesting explanation of the levels of determinism that we could face. some arguments against determinism are something like the following formalism by Tymothy O'Connor in his article On the Transfer of Necessity :
(TNP) Nst p, Nst (p → q) ├ Nst q
pretty much what the statements says is that if it is necessary the case that p then q then it has to be q. the problem is when we come to the argument of what if -q? then the original statement p then q looses a little bit of credibility, because there is a case (the second case in the truth table) where an if-then relationship is false; so if it was the case that -q, even though p, then it would be necessarily the case that p then q. So, if in logic terms there is room for possibility as opposed as necessity, then a deterministic model wouldn't make full logical sense.

1 comment:

Anonymous said...

ok i understand that it is the first part of some sort of deterministic saga, but you realize that that logical thing by O'Connor goes against determinism, at least, thats what i get from it. pretty much what i understand, and no logician, but i think it mean that p then q doesnt have to be p then q, there could be a possible state of affair where -q or -p, or whatever part of the argument that make sit not valid. in order for p then q to hold it would have to be some sort of universal fact, like a law or something so that it was necessarily the case that p then q... wouldn't you agree?