Tuesday, January 12, 2010
aesthetics...
so i'm no artist... i have some preferences, sure, but i dont create many things outside of my thoughts. i like pretty things, whatever it is that i consider pretty. i change my environment so that it fits what i like; i play some music, i decorate, i wear clothes that i like.however, i dont rely on this preference system in order to fully express myself, i usually choose to do so in different ways. some people that i've talked to, agree on the following issue: art is not just an outside engagement. I'm not sure whether i agree or not, but i do find it puzzling, the middle point that is. what is it that makes something be on the outside, as opposed to the inside, of the mind. So 'clearly' expressing what my thoughts are would put them on the outside iff im uttering, painting, musicalizing, photographing or acting this clear expression (note to audience:many other ways were ommited for the sake of economy, which has been lost with this note...). So what if i dont "put it out"? what if i just think it, and keep it in? say one day im just thinking about how beautiful a cherry tree would look under a particular type of light, such that, it looks like a warm sunset with the solitude of white flowers. is this artistic if its not comunicating anything? if it is the case that i am, in fact, an artistic being, how can anyone tell?
going back to the first person/third person perspective pointed out in mind/body problem literature, or the unnaccessibility to measurable intentions, being able to tell whether someone is doing art or not, is kinda hard.
now, there are art experts. these experts are able to judge, by comparison, one art work with another, or one art work with a general idea. conceptually this should be a fair enough job. nonetheless, how can one judge one art work over another, if the artists are completely different persons, and even if the artist is the same, art works take place at, presumably, different times, perhaps different emotions. How can we set a prefered set of values over the artists prefered set of values?
so what bugs me is that we can't really pin point at 'the artist' given that identifying one relies on the testimony of the person, and this might be biased. Also we can't offer an ultimate 'art judgement' given the problem of setting an almost arbitrary prefered reference frame.
new year...new intentions
in the meantime, im thinking about causation...
Saturday, August 9, 2008
Rediscovering the Philosophical Importance of Jose Ingenieros: A Bridge Between Two Worlds is being published by VDM Verlag in 12 countries. Manuela was born in Cd. Juarez and she obtained her M.A. in Philosophy from Texas A&M. Yesterday, August 8th, she held a book presentation at the Centro Cultural Paso del Norte in Cd. Juarez, Chihuahua where professors, students, and spectators alike gathered to witness Manuela's first book. The panel of about 5 professors, including Manuela herself, gave their take on the book itself. Some placed the book in its historical context, while others praised Manuela's achievement. There was an overall sentiment of joy and inspiration; one audience member commenting during the Q&A segment that he believed that girls should look up to Manuela in being well educated. He went on to say that this is the kind of people Cd. Juarez needs, but that he was sure that there were many Manuelas in this city; we just need to polish them.
Saturday, May 17, 2008
In the effort of filtering possibility from conceivability claims, many problems arise. In order to come to possibility from conceivability a method can be followed. Nevertheless the method is problematic given the overlapping of steps. I will briefly explain how the method works, the reason for following that order of steps and where it is that the overlapping takes place. It is in the overlapping where I will spend more time comparing the problem of confusing epistemology with metaphysics when it comes to different perspectives of two-dimensionalism. The last topic has to do with arguments that show a problematic view of two-dimensionalism and the confusion of epistemology and metaphysics and mistreatment of descriptions. I have not added a sufficient explanation yet since more information is required at this point, but those issues will be addressed in a future draft.
What I want to do with this research is try to find more complete ways to address the problem of the overlapping steps and their similitude with two-dimensionalism. It is my purpose to try to avoid falling under the reliance on a confusing view of metaphysics. Here is an overview of the main topics that I want to address (this far)
- Filtering possibility: How is it that a conceivable state of affairs could make reference to impossible states of affairs?
- Method: intuition… epistemology… metaphysics…
- Overlapping of steps 1^2 and 2^ 3
- Incomplete nature of the world
- Given (3) ^ (4) possible confusion of metaphysics and epistemology
- Avoiding non-essential generalizations
- Two-dimensionalism semantics
- Possible additions that I would like to address but have not read enough yet
Filtering possibility
Conceivability can be found in some of the arguments concerning fundamental philosophical questions. This fact happens to be problematic since a conceivable claim that could be used for further theoretical relevance might be resting in weak foundations attributing false possibility. A conceivable claim is not necessarily an argument for the possibility of some states of affairs. This will be supported by a three step method that consists of an intuition claim, an epistemic claim and a metaphysical filter. After these three steps the conceivability argument becomes a metaphysical possibility if it doesn’t show any problematic pattern in its way to the third step.
A possible method
Thus the method consists of the following:
1. Intuitive claim... what is it that we think we know from x(identify soundness of concepts)
2. Epistemic-modal claim… what is it that could be true of x given what we know and what we have proved to be truth of x (identify validity of concepts). In this step the target is the conceptual realm.
3. Metaphysical filter… what is it that is true of x given the nature of the world (identify the relation of the full argument with the way that the world is)
Notice that [(1) ^ (2)] and [(2) ^ (3)] are closely related, and that they might be confused, respectively, as one single step.
my apy polly logies!!!
Saturday, March 22, 2008
Gödel's Proof
What struck me as peculiarly interesting are the concluding comments by the authors in the last chapter. They give consideration to the question of whether there could ever be "calculating machines" powerful enough to match the human brain in mathematical intelligence. They acknowledge that there are some mathematical problems that are solvable by a computing machinery which are not solvable by a human beings. However, they go on, the human brain appears to embody a "structure of rules of operation" that far exceeds the structure of artificial machines. There doesn't appear to be a prospect for the replacement of human minds by robots. While these AI speculations, it must be said, only occupy a page or two in the entire 115-page book, they only serve to lead to the admonition that Gödel's paper is no excuse to start despairing. Instead, Gödel's finding "is an occasion...for a renewed appreciation of the powers of creative reason."
Friday, November 23, 2007
levels of determinism part I
(TNP) Nst p, Nst (p → q) ├ Nst q
pretty much what the statements says is that if it is necessary the case that p then q then it has to be q. the problem is when we come to the argument of what if -q? then the original statement p then q looses a little bit of credibility, because there is a case (the second case in the truth table) where an if-then relationship is false; so if it was the case that -q, even though p, then it would be necessarily the case that p then q. So, if in logic terms there is room for possibility as opposed as necessity, then a deterministic model wouldn't make full logical sense.
conceivability and possibility
this whole argument is well explored by a lot of philosophers, but it is still a conceivability argument, we cant probe it, however we can imagine a POSSIBLE world where there are zombies who are qualia absent. so it is hard to tell whether conceivability entails possibility, or possibility has different limits than conceivability.
Thursday, November 8, 2007
Philosophy of Religioin
There exists in my opinion the most compelling and eloquent arguments yet: those of Richard Dawkins. He brings to surface qualities which a God, if one exists, might value. These include an analysis and eventual rejection of Pascal's wager, which states that one won't lose anything by either believing or not believing. If one believes, says Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), in God and it turns out that there is a God then one can only gain something, namely entrance into heaven. If there isn't a God then there is nothing to lose. If, however, one doesn't believe and it turns out that there is a God then one can only suffer eternal damnation. If there is no God and one doesn't believe then, again, there is no problem. This is of no use, says Dawkins, because "why, in any case, do we so readily accept the idea that the one thing you must do if you want to please God is believe in him?" (The God Delusion, 2006, p. 104). Dawkins goes on to talk about Bertrand Russell and how he would reply upon encountering a God after death. Russell said that he would point out the absence of evidence in God's favor. Commenting on Russell's case, Dawkins says, "Mightn't God respect Russell for his courageous scepticism (let alone for the courageous pacifism that landed him in prison in the First World War) far more than he would respect Pascal for his cowardly bet-heding?" (p. 104).
Dawkin's arguments, among many other elaborate and well-thought-out ones in his book, also include the notion of a burden of proof. Who does it rest with? Unequivocally, with the believer. We don't feel an obligation, argues Dawkins, to disprove any of the millions of "far-fetched" deities, such as Zeus, a Flying Spaghetti Monster, Apollo, a celestial teapot, Amon, Ra, Mithras, Baal, Thor, Wotan, the Golden Calf. "I just go one god further" (p. 53).
-Pablo
Wednesday, October 31, 2007
relational dialectics in the process of socialization
Monday, October 22, 2007
on the relativity of human rights
For all x, there is some y such that Dxy...where... x=human y=human rights D=deserve
So, in the logical sense if every human deserves these rights, where is it that the process is broken?
ok, so im gonna be needing some experts on ethics, lets talk ethics and moral philosophy for a while, just for fun... how about that?
Tuesday, October 9, 2007
yes... functionalism again...
i was thinking this: before she left the room she had a syntactical grasp of things. after she left the room she had a semantical grasp. now the crucial point is the fact that she left the room and started 'experiencing' or experimenting...and finally realizing what ever it was that she had been learning all along.
since i started reading philosophy i've been quite skeptic towards distinctions. analytic and sythetic, apriori and aposteriori, syntax and semantics, and so on... and maybe this sounds funny...but there has to be a detonator that bursts this distinction... so where is the fine line that divides one side from the other... in the case of Mary before and after the room i would say that there is something such that that something makes Mary conscious or aware of something, by herself. she steped from the third person perspective to the first person perspective...she was finally doing it by herself. i think this is a huge criticism against functionalism, because is bringing back the relevance of metaphysics by taking under account the existence (wihtout any particular ontological view) of the mind as a weird thing to talk about, not as a fuction of the body.
Saturday, October 6, 2007
art or science? or both...or not...
i think there would have to be a sharp distinction between objectivity and subjectivity in order narrow the 'fraud' possibilities. but even if we come up with an 'objectivized' scientific inquiry, we would have the hypothesis formulation as the first step of the scientific method, which is mere metaphysical inquiry. this goes beyond objectivity. so if science is subjective, because it comes from the search of subjective entities, then knowledge itself even if committed to a system of proof, would be subjective. So art would come first than science, science would come to regulate art, and then we would be back to art again. right? but isn't it a logical process? isn't logic a scientific inquiry?