Tuesday, January 12, 2010

aesthetics...

initial disclaimer, since this is not a fully formal communication method, i hope u bear with me on my lack of interest on capitalizing i's.
so i'm no artist... i have some preferences, sure, but i dont create many things outside of my thoughts. i like pretty things, whatever it is that i consider pretty. i change my environment so that it fits what i like; i play some music, i decorate, i wear clothes that i like.however, i dont rely on this preference system in order to fully express myself, i usually choose to do so in different ways. some people that i've talked to, agree on the following issue: art is not just an outside engagement. I'm not sure whether i agree or not, but i do find it puzzling, the middle point that is. what is it that makes something be on the outside, as opposed to the inside, of the mind. So 'clearly' expressing what my thoughts are would put them on the outside iff im uttering, painting, musicalizing, photographing or acting this clear expression (note to audience:many other ways were ommited for the sake of economy, which has been lost with this note...). So what if i dont "put it out"? what if i just think it, and keep it in? say one day im just thinking about how beautiful a cherry tree would look under a particular type of light, such that, it looks like a warm sunset with the solitude of white flowers. is this artistic if its not comunicating anything? if it is the case that i am, in fact, an artistic being, how can anyone tell?
going back to the first person/third person perspective pointed out in mind/body problem literature, or the unnaccessibility to measurable intentions, being able to tell whether someone is doing art or not, is kinda hard.
now, there are art experts. these experts are able to judge, by comparison, one art work with another, or one art work with a general idea. conceptually this should be a fair enough job. nonetheless, how can one judge one art work over another, if the artists are completely different persons, and even if the artist is the same, art works take place at, presumably, different times, perhaps different emotions. How can we set a prefered set of values over the artists prefered set of values?
so what bugs me is that we can't really pin point at 'the artist' given that identifying one relies on the testimony of the person, and this might be biased. Also we can't offer an ultimate 'art judgement' given the problem of setting an almost arbitrary prefered reference frame.

new year...new intentions

im intending to be a bit more inclusive this year, so im gonna try blogging again...we'll see how it goes...
in the meantime, im thinking about causation...

Saturday, August 9, 2008

Manuela Gomez has just published a book about Argentinian philosopher Jose Ingenieros (whose works have never been translated to English) where she links his ideas to those of Ralph Waldo Emerson. In a wider perspective, some gaps between Latin American philosophy and pragmatism are bridged.

Rediscovering the Philosophical Importance of Jose Ingenieros: A Bridge Between Two Worlds is being published by VDM Verlag in 12 countries. Manuela was born in Cd. Juarez and she obtained her M.A. in Philosophy from Texas A&M. Yesterday, August 8th, she held a book presentation at the Centro Cultural Paso del Norte in Cd. Juarez, Chihuahua where professors, students, and spectators alike gathered to witness Manuela's first book. The panel of about 5 professors, including Manuela herself, gave their take on the book itself. Some placed the book in its historical context, while others praised Manuela's achievement. There was an overall sentiment of joy and inspiration; one audience member commenting during the Q&A segment that he believed that girls should look up to Manuela in being well educated. He went on to say that this is the kind of people Cd. Juarez needs, but that he was sure that there were many Manuelas in this city; we just need to polish them.

Saturday, May 17, 2008

here is a part of the draft of my thesis proposal, tell me what you find here, it has already been turned in, but comments are aprecciated for future work!
In the effort of filtering possibility from conceivability claims, many problems arise. In order to come to possibility from conceivability a method can be followed. Nevertheless the method is problematic given the overlapping of steps. I will briefly explain how the method works, the reason for following that order of steps and where it is that the overlapping takes place. It is in the overlapping where I will spend more time comparing the problem of confusing epistemology with metaphysics when it comes to different perspectives of two-dimensionalism. The last topic has to do with arguments that show a problematic view of two-dimensionalism and the confusion of epistemology and metaphysics and mistreatment of descriptions. I have not added a sufficient explanation yet since more information is required at this point, but those issues will be addressed in a future draft.

What I want to do with this research is try to find more complete ways to address the problem of the overlapping steps and their similitude with two-dimensionalism. It is my purpose to try to avoid falling under the reliance on a confusing view of metaphysics. Here is an overview of the main topics that I want to address (this far)
  1. Filtering possibility: How is it that a conceivable state of affairs could make reference to impossible states of affairs?
  2. Method: intuition… epistemology… metaphysics…
  3. Overlapping of steps 1^2 and 2^ 3
  4. Incomplete nature of the world
  5. Given (3) ^ (4) possible confusion of metaphysics and epistemology
  6. Avoiding non-essential generalizations
  7. Two-dimensionalism semantics
  8. Possible additions that I would like to address but have not read enough yet

Filtering possibility
Conceivability can be found in some of the arguments concerning fundamental philosophical questions. This fact happens to be problematic since a conceivable claim that could be used for further theoretical relevance might be resting in weak foundations attributing false possibility. A conceivable claim is not necessarily an argument for the possibility of some states of affairs. This will be supported by a three step method that consists of an intuition claim, an epistemic claim and a metaphysical filter. After these three steps the conceivability argument becomes a metaphysical possibility if it doesn’t show any problematic pattern in its way to the third step.

A possible method

Thus the method consists of the following:

1. Intuitive claim... what is it that we think we know from x(identify soundness of concepts)

2. Epistemic-modal claim… what is it that could be true of x given what we know and what we have proved to be truth of x (identify validity of concepts). In this step the target is the conceptual realm.

3. Metaphysical filter… what is it that is true of x given the nature of the world (identify the relation of the full argument with the way that the world is)

Notice that [(1) ^ (2)] and [(2) ^ (3)] are closely related, and that they might be confused, respectively, as one single step.


my apy polly logies!!!

ok sorry i had forgot about this blog thing. this semester was super packed, but summer is here... finally!!!!!!!! its funny because i feel like writing, it must be the weather, which is one of those things that you just and say only in El Paso, or maybe it is due to global warming, or global cooling, but the weather here is weird. anyways i'll try to post more, i have a lot to say and a lot to be corrected so please leave comments, feedback is good

Saturday, March 22, 2008

Gödel's Proof

So I read this 1958 book which, according to a philosophy professor, is a must in any philosopher's library. It is concise and what's more it explains technical language, as it pertains to getting the gist of Gödel's paper, for a non-expert. The first few chapters explain the context in which Gödel, only 25 at the time, published his "On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems." In that paper Gödel proved that the axiomatic method had inherent limitations and, as the authors of Gödel's Proof Nagel and Newman indicate in the introduction to this book, Gödel proved that "it is impossible to establish the internal logical consistency of a very large class of deductive systems unless one adopts principles of reasoning so complex that their internal consistency is as open to doubt as that of the systems themselves." Indeed, this "internal logical consistency" refers to the fact that a proposition, G, and its formal negation, ~G, are formally demonstrable. If a formula and its formal negation are demonstrable it means that the axioms of that system are not consistent. Conversely, if the axioms of a system are consistent then neither the formula G nor its formal negation, ~G, are demonstrable. In short, Gödel undermined the axiomatic method. It proved that there are logical truths that cannot be demonstrated using an axiomatic method. Even if the axioms were extended so as to include the formal demonstration of a particular logical truth, there would still be other logical truths that the axioms did not cover.

What struck me as peculiarly interesting are the concluding comments by the authors in the last chapter. They give consideration to the question of whether there could ever be "calculating machines" powerful enough to match the human brain in mathematical intelligence. They acknowledge that there are some mathematical problems that are solvable by a computing machinery which are not solvable by a human beings. However, they go on, the human brain appears to embody a "structure of rules of operation" that far exceeds the structure of artificial machines. There doesn't appear to be a prospect for the replacement of human minds by robots. While these AI speculations, it must be said, only occupy a page or two in the entire 115-page book, they only serve to lead to the admonition that Gödel's paper is no excuse to start despairing. Instead, Gödel's finding "is an occasion...for a renewed appreciation of the powers of creative reason."

Friday, November 23, 2007

levels of determinism part I

for some reason I've become quite interested in determinism! and not in the religious sense, but more in the there-is-no-free-will-thanks-to-the-degree-of-freedom kind of way. well, actually, i don't mean to say that, that there is no free will, that would be to hardcore, and I'm not there yet to prove it; however, what I've been reading is a very interesting explanation of the levels of determinism that we could face. some arguments against determinism are something like the following formalism by Tymothy O'Connor in his article On the Transfer of Necessity :
(TNP) Nst p, Nst (p → q) ├ Nst q
pretty much what the statements says is that if it is necessary the case that p then q then it has to be q. the problem is when we come to the argument of what if -q? then the original statement p then q looses a little bit of credibility, because there is a case (the second case in the truth table) where an if-then relationship is false; so if it was the case that -q, even though p, then it would be necessarily the case that p then q. So, if in logic terms there is room for possibility as opposed as necessity, then a deterministic model wouldn't make full logical sense.

conceivability and possibility

it has come to my attention repeatedly the fact that many of the philosophical arguments within the philosophy of mind are based on conceivability. also many of the objections to some of the arguments are based on conceivability. Even though many would agree that as long as it is conceivable, it might be possible... right? how could it be denied that there is some sort of existence of possibilities that we just dont have access to. furthermore, the problem with possibility as opposed as conceivability is that we would have to commit to a kripkean modality , like it is not very likely to happen under a certain set of conditions but there might be a possible state of affairs under which it is possible. For example there is the zombie argument against functionalism. the problem with zombies is that they might act the same way that an active agent would, but, presumably, they wouldn't have any qualitative experience. the zombie would know what it is like to eat tofurkey, but would, nevertheless, would be able to eat it, and possibly make comments about. but the zombie would be either lying or non-consciously just trying to mimic a behavior.
this whole argument is well explored by a lot of philosophers, but it is still a conceivability argument, we cant probe it, however we can imagine a POSSIBLE world where there are zombies who are qualia absent. so it is hard to tell whether conceivability entails possibility, or possibility has different limits than conceivability.

Thursday, November 8, 2007

Philosophy of Religioin

Before submitting this entry, I had begun by writing a couple of paragraphs on the problem of evil and the so-called Euthyphro's dilemma (based on a dialogue by Plato), but then regarded them as both archaic and somewhat obsolete compared to evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkin's arguments.

There exists in my opinion the most compelling and eloquent arguments yet: those of Richard Dawkins. He brings to surface qualities which a God, if one exists, might value. These include an analysis and eventual rejection of Pascal's wager, which states that one won't lose anything by either believing or not believing. If one believes, says Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), in God and it turns out that there is a God then one can only gain something, namely entrance into heaven. If there isn't a God then there is nothing to lose. If, however, one doesn't believe and it turns out that there is a God then one can only suffer eternal damnation. If there is no God and one doesn't believe then, again, there is no problem. This is of no use, says Dawkins, because "why, in any case, do we so readily accept the idea that the one thing you must do if you want to please God is believe in him?" (The God Delusion, 2006, p. 104). Dawkins goes on to talk about Bertrand Russell and how he would reply upon encountering a God after death. Russell said that he would point out the absence of evidence in God's favor. Commenting on Russell's case, Dawkins says, "Mightn't God respect Russell for his courageous scepticism (let alone for the courageous pacifism that landed him in prison in the First World War) far more than he would respect Pascal for his cowardly bet-heding?" (p. 104).

Dawkin's arguments, among many other elaborate and well-thought-out ones in his book, also include the notion of a burden of proof. Who does it rest with? Unequivocally, with the believer. We don't feel an obligation, argues Dawkins, to disprove any of the millions of "far-fetched" deities, such as Zeus, a Flying Spaghetti Monster, Apollo, a celestial teapot, Amon, Ra, Mithras, Baal, Thor, Wotan, the Golden Calf. "I just go one god further" (p. 53).

-Pablo

Wednesday, October 31, 2007

relational dialectics in the process of socialization

Tomorrow, Thursday November 1st at 4pm at Cotton Memorial room 207, the Philosophy Club will be having the lecture "relational dialectics in the process of socialization" by Patricia Smith. Smith has a BA in Communications from the University of Texas at El Paso and is currently working on her MA. Basically the topic refers to the informality of language and the way that many principles are not respected thanks to the process of socialization (adaptation). One of the principles that most of us would like to respect is the principle of non-contradiction. Smith will show us the way that relational dialectics break all this principles that would maybe simplify the process of socialization by making a statement clear and persistent throughout the discourse.

Monday, October 22, 2007

on the relativity of human rights

this Wednesday, October 24th, AI @ El Paso and the Philosophy Club @ UTEP are presenting a panel on the relativity of human rights. the panel will consists of 3 outstanding speakers: Dr Simon, chair of the philosophy dpt at UTEP, Dr Ferret faculty in the philosophy dpt at UTEP and Dr Wren Faculty from the humanities dpt also at UTEP. each of the speakers will talk form 15 to 20 minutes on a topic of their choice around the relativity of human rights. you are welcomed to come and join us, its gonna be at the University Suite, East Union 3rd floor, at 7 pm here at UTEP... so, what do you think about this topic? how about discussing ethical systems for a change... not to say that I'm changing my min...lol!! just that ethical systems crash against each other creating a problem with the respect towards equality. one system may consider one thing as ethical and another system may consider that ethical thing as unethical. these disagreements are supposed to be dismissed thanks to international law and the declaration of human rights, however, how is it that human rights become a necessary condition of the natural process? do they? i would say that human rights bend, or become contingent within this possible world. ok maybe that does not make sense at all, but can you understand what i mean? human rights are supossed to be a measure to ALL, but if not ALL get them then:
For all x, there is some y such that Dxy...where... x=human y=human rights D=deserve
So, in the logical sense if every human deserves these rights, where is it that the process is broken?
ok, so im gonna be needing some experts on ethics, lets talk ethics and moral philosophy for a while, just for fun... how about that?

Tuesday, October 9, 2007

yes... functionalism again...

ok...so... going back to the point of functionalism... we are saying that the mind is a function of the body (brain) so we wouldnt have to get into dualism activity or any cartesian notion of the mind body problem where the body is aware and the mind understands. however, if we are talking about qualia and the understanding of this qualitive experiences, then we start talking about semantics. so if we take the example of Mary and the room, which is that Mary has been living in a black and white room without any kind of qualitive experience..only learning ...but not direct empirical experience. when Mary leaves the room she starts experiencing all this stuff... so the point is that before leaving the room... was she learning? do we learn without experiencing?
i was thinking this: before she left the room she had a syntactical grasp of things. after she left the room she had a semantical grasp. now the crucial point is the fact that she left the room and started 'experiencing' or experimenting...and finally realizing what ever it was that she had been learning all along.
since i started reading philosophy i've been quite skeptic towards distinctions. analytic and sythetic, apriori and aposteriori, syntax and semantics, and so on... and maybe this sounds funny...but there has to be a detonator that bursts this distinction... so where is the fine line that divides one side from the other... in the case of Mary before and after the room i would say that there is something such that that something makes Mary conscious or aware of something, by herself. she steped from the third person perspective to the first person perspective...she was finally doing it by herself. i think this is a huge criticism against functionalism, because is bringing back the relevance of metaphysics by taking under account the existence (wihtout any particular ontological view) of the mind as a weird thing to talk about, not as a fuction of the body.

Saturday, October 6, 2007

art or science? or both...or not...

does art contain science? does sicence contain art? are those two completely diferent disciplines? i've been thinking about this, and i think that science could be concidered as art, since we start with curiosity, some level of creativity and inspiration, then we formulate a hypothesis then we follow the method... the scientific one...right? but then would't it make sicence too subjetive? i mean..to consider it as art...because we may turn science into art, but can we turn art into sicence without leading it to fraud?
i think there would have to be a sharp distinction between objectivity and subjectivity in order narrow the 'fraud' possibilities. but even if we come up with an 'objectivized' scientific inquiry, we would have the hypothesis formulation as the first step of the scientific method, which is mere metaphysical inquiry. this goes beyond objectivity. so if science is subjective, because it comes from the search of subjective entities, then knowledge itself even if committed to a system of proof, would be subjective. So art would come first than science, science would come to regulate art, and then we would be back to art again. right? but isn't it a logical process? isn't logic a scientific inquiry?

Tuesday, October 2, 2007

is functionalism really THAT problematic?

according to one of the criticisms against functionalism, if we are reducing thought (concious experience) to being a function of the body then it has to be taken under consideration the fact that a function doesnt really have to UNDERSTAND whatever the funtion is. the entity 'looses' its ability to identify and process meaning. This is the Syntactical approach against functionalism. the fact that the entity has no intentionality, or that it doesn't matter if it does, as long as it remains doing its function, is problematic for any kind of conciousness talk. So, should it matter? having intentionality gives us our 'humanity', our choices, our desires, our beliefs. however, arent this just reactions to qualitative experiences?

Monday, October 1, 2007

naturalism and conceptualization

the conceptualization of metaphysical claims helps us to understand the natural world, but how far can we go on this conceptualization without loosing track of the objectivity that naturalism has to offer? however metaphysics is the one of the best access that we have in order to do epistemology, but if we are taking under consideration that concepts help us to understand the bigger structure of the natural process then we are following the scientific mehtod with natural means... what do you think?

intro

so we have now a good spot to give away some thoughts on philosophy or current issues, hopefully we'll make a good use of this space to get to good discussions and ultimately learning stuff..right?